Is it possible to restore the Iran Nuclear Deal?

The US and Iran are negotiating a deal that would lift tough sanctions against Iran in exchange for a major reversal of Iran’s recent nuclear gains. However, its resumption with Iran has proved more difficult than many of its supporters expected and its opponents feared. JCPOA signatories began talks to bring Washington and Tehran back into the agreement in April 2021, but they’ve since been off and on, complicated by Iran’s election of conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi as president and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, among other developments. 

The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a significant accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief. [1]

Since April 2021, parties to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have sought to revive the agreement abandoned by U.S. President Donald Trump, calling it “the worst deal ever.” The previous US president argued that the deal failed to curtail nuclear activities, ballistic missile program and regional influence, and reimposed sanctions that damage Iran’s economy by limiting its oil exports. In response, the Iranian economy not only did not collapse and there was no regime change in the country, but Tehran also began to increase its uranium enrichment.

The Biden administration announced its intention to move in this direction almost immediately after coming to power in January 2021. Negotiations between Iran and its interlocutors – the U.S., France, the UK, Russia, China and Germany, coordinated by the EU – made progress over eight rounds in Vienna. 

Months of indirect talks between Iran and the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden seemed close to a deal in March 2022 in Vienna, but the talks broke down due to Iran’s demand that the United States provide guarantees that future American administrations will not withdraw from the agreement. Tehran also demanded that the IAEA drops its investigation into uranium traces found at three nuclear sites in Iran. [2] But its abolition would run contrary to the agency’s mandate for nuclear accountability, and the U.S. and the three European parties (France, Germany and the UK) oppose the idea of doing so. In addition, Iran put forward a new demand to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the foreign terrorist organization (FTO) list.

Meanwhile, Republicans in the US House and Senate pressured the Biden administration over the Iranian issue. In March 2022, 49 Republican senators signed a statement asserting that they would not support a revived Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and world powers. [3] The White House made it clear that the Americans did not intend to link the nuclear deal with the completion of the IAEA investigation.

Despite disagreements on key issues, the EU took a number of additional steps to revitalize the process as the main mediator. Iran and the US launched another round of indirect talks in Qatar in June 2022, mediated by the EU, but they did not bring any results.

The next round of negotiations started in Vienna in early August 2022, when the EU presented a compromise text after several days of discussions with all parties. Iran sent its remarks to the US via the EU, and the US presented its views to Iran through European mediators. Although Iran’s response dropped its demand to remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, but according to the Washington Post, Iranian demands included guarantees to maintain the nuclear deal in case of a change of power in the United States, as well as that the IAEA drops the investigation into nuclear particles found at three sites in Iran. [4] US officials called Iran’s response “unconstructive”. Since then, Tehran and Washington have exchanged several counterproposals, but the prospects for reaching an agreed document are still unclear.

At this moment Iran is again talking with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to settle a dispute over an investigation into questions regarding nuclear materials found at three sites in Iran. If the decision is implemented, it could break a deadlock in the stalled negotiations for a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).  [5]

Who benefits from the new deal with Iran?

Opponents of the deal argue that if the sanctions are lifted, Tehran will have additional sources of income that it can spend on proxy groups in the Middle East. Another concern is that Iran, once freed from energy sanctions, could make oil swap deals with Russia, and allow Moscow to circumvent energy sanctions. Specifically, Russia could get a backdoor to sell its oil by supplying crude to northern Iran via the Caspian Sea, while Iran would sell an equivalent amount of crude on Russia’s behalf in Iranian tankers. According to some experts, the argument is far-fetched. Technical difficulties aside, Iran will make more money selling its own hydrocarbons than acting as a transit point for Russia.[6]

Supporters of the deal consistently argue that this is the best and only way to curb Iran’s rapidly accelerating nuclear program. While Iran’s nuclear activities are key issue, another important factor in the deal is the West’s desire to secure new energy sources as Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed to slash oil production. [7]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused a sharp rise in world oil and gas prices, while many European countries dependent on energy imports from Russia. Europe’s overdependence on Russian energy resources and Russia’s use of energy weapons to further exploit the geopolitical dimension led to the problem of finding an alternative to Russian energy sources following sanctions imposed on Russia by the US and Europe. Thus, while Europe is preparing an embargo on Russian oil at the end of this year, some countries are looking towards Iran.

Iran also needs a deal: it will open access for Iranian oil to the world economy, where it will quickly replenish the country’s budget due to high energy prices. Iran has the world’s second largest natural gas reserves after Russia and the fourth largest oil reserves [8], but high levels of domestic consumption and a lack of investment and advanced technology in recent decades have prevented Iran from becoming a major player. This factor makes the Europeans eager to restore relations as soon as possible by lifting tough economic sanctions against Iran, which limited its ability to export energy.

Moreover, the lifting of sanctions against Iran will also allow Armenia and Georgia to become transit countries for the export of energy resources from this country. The Iran-Armenia-Georgia connection is a strategic interest of Tehran, which is evidenced by the opening of the Iranian consulate in the city of Kapan (Syunik region of Armenia) to strengthen the North-South transit road. This route is an urgent demand for balancing the power in the South Caucasus region.

However, the United States is most interested in the deal. Despite the strong opposition to the nuclear deal by Israel, some Gulf Arab states, and many members of the US Congress, the Biden administration continues to engage with Iran on nuclear talks through indirect negotiations in Vienna. The reasons for Biden’s insistence on reaching an agreement are linked to the need for a foreign policy victory after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the hope that the resolution of the nuclear issue will lead to a decrease in tensions in the Persian Gulf, which will allow Washington to focus its attention on the Indo-Pacific region and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The Biden administration also believes that bringing Iran back into the JCPOA will not only make the Middle East a safer place, but also allow the US to finally “turn to Asia” to confront the growing strengh of China.

If the Vienna negotiations are successful and the JCPOA is revitalized, the oil sanctions on Iran will be lifted. This development benefits the United States as it will allow more oil to enter the world market and lower gasoline prices for American consumers. At the same time, even if the US and Iran make a deal, its implementation will be complex and step-by-step, and it will likely take several months before sanctions on Iran are lifted. Iran will be able to arrange the supply of raw materials to Europe only by 2023, since Iran will need time to restore infrastructure.

Thus, the fate of the nuclear deal remains uncertain. The effort to restore the JCPOA turned out to be an arduous and in many ways peculiar exercise. Russia’s Ukraine war has shifted world powers’ focus and made cooperation more diffictult, while disagreements between Tehran and Washington on key issues are deadlocked. And there is no certainty that a deal will be reached before the November US midterm elections. The wave of protests sweeping Iran is complicating the Biden administration’s calculus as it pushes for a renewed nuclear deal with a country whose leaders are accused of oppressing and abusing their own people. Time passes, and if the negotiations drag on, it will be extremely difficult to revive the JCPOA. As Iran prepares to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the failure to restore the JCPOA will bring Iran closer to Russia and China in an emerging multipolar world. If Tehran and Washington fail to get back on agreement, they will face the problem of their 40-year rivalry escalating into a deeper enmity. Although hope is fading, a deal is still possible, as both parties are interested in it and want to restore it on favorable terms. However, this requires positive political will and recognition of the fact that all alternatives are worse than an agreement that, although imperfect, but still satisfies most of the needs of the sides.


[1] Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.

[2] Tehran also demanded that the IAEA drops its investigation into uranium traces found at three nuclear sites in Iran.

[3] In March 2022, 49 Republican senators signed a statement asserting that they would not support a revived Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and world powers.

[4] Although Iran’s response dropped its demand to remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, but according to the Washington Post, Iranian demands included guarantees to maintain the nuclear deal in case of a change of power in the United States, as well as that the IAEA drops the investigation into nuclear particles found at three sites in Iran.

[5] If the decision is implemented, it could break a deadlock in the stalled negotiations for a return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

[6] Technical difficulties aside, Iran will make more money selling its own hydrocarbons than acting as a transit point for Russia.

[7] While Iran’s nuclear activities are key issue, another important factor in the deal is the West’s desire to secure new energy sources as Russia and Saudi Arabia agreed to slash oil production.

[8] Iran has the world’s second largest natural gas reserves after Russia and the fourth largest oil reserves

Author:
Veronika Vanian, ECIR Expert, Head of the South Caucasus studies